Exercise in Futility: MI5 to Investigate Itself Over Manchester “Missed Warnings”

Kurt Nimmo

The Guardian reports:

MI5 has launched two urgent inquiries into how it missed the danger posed by the Manchester bomber, Salman Abedi, amid claims his interest in being a potential terrorist killer was repeatedly reported to the authorities.

Britain’s domestic security service started one review last week, which will aim to quickly identify any glaring errors, while the other will be more in depth, the Guardian has learned.

MI5 and British intelligence have a long track record of protecting and enabling terrorists, so any such investigation will be less than futile.

MI5 doesn’t miss “warnings” about terrorist attacks. It simply does not act on them. All the major terror leaders in Britain are monitored. Informers attach themselves to key people. In fact, a number of Islamist movement leaders in Britain are either informers or cooperate with British intelligence.

This has been a fact since at least the early 1980s.

Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi is linked to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). A group of LIFG members lived within close proximity to Abedi in Whalley Range. LIFG is a proscribed terrorist group and listed as such by the UK government, and yet a number of LIFG radicals operated out of Manchester.

Most telling is the accusation MI5 worked with LIFG in a plot to kill Libyan leader Gaddafi (the mission failed).

This fits a distinct pattern. British intelligence allows known and dangerous terrorists to live and organize in the country. It does not act on information gathered by informers on terrorist plots and refuses to allow its collaborators to be prosecuted for crimes committed outside the country. It monitors communication between al-Qaeda and Islamists in Britain and does nothing about it.

The following is a selection of articles from History Commons. It is a timeline showing the deception and mendacity of British intelligence.

1984 and After: US and British Intelligence Are Aware that Terrorist Abu Nidal Is Using BCCI in London, but Take No Action

1987-1990: US and British Intelligence Aware Middle Eastern Governments Are Paying Large Sums to Terrorist Abu Nidal, but Take No Action

December 1995: British Domestic Intelligence Tells Police that Islamist Militant Threat Is ‘Greatly Exaggerated’

1996: British Intelligence and Al-Qaeda Allegedly Cooperate in Plot to Assassinate Libyan Leader

June 1996-February 1997: British Intelligence Recruits Prominent Al-Qaeda Imam Abu Qatada

Early 1997: Leading Radical Imam Abu Hamza Begins Working with British Security Services

October 1, 1997: MI5 Not Concerned that Leading Asset Abu Hamza Intends to Fund Terrorism Overseas

November 20, 1997: British Intelligence Asset Abu Hamza Refuses to Denounce Recent Killing of 60 Tourists in Egypt

Summer 1998 and After: British Intelligence Informer Abu Hamza Runs ‘Al-Qaeda Guest House in London’

August 22, 1998: Leading London-Based Radical Bakri Reveals Deal with British Authorities

March 15-19, 1999: British Informer Abu Hamza Involved in Multiple Murders Is Arrested and Released

November 1999: Veteran Jihadis Move to Birmingham; British Intelligence Not Interested

December 1999: British Authorities Return Confiscated Bomb Manual and Violence-Inciting Tapes to Top Militant and Informer Abu Hamza

Before April 21, 2000: British Intelligence Learns of Apparent Link between Top London-Based Militant and Bin Laden

After April 21, 2000: Informer Thinks British Authorities Do Not ‘Give a Sh*t’ Islamist Killers Live in London

April 22-June 27, 2001: Some Hijackers Transit London on Way to US, One or More Apparently on British Watch List

Summer 2001: Radical London Imam Abu Hamza Encourages Supporters to Pledge Loyalty to Bin Laden, British Authorities Take No Action

Late September 2001: Friend of Imam Abu Qatada Agrees to Become British Informant

October 21, 2001: Radical Imam Abu Qatada Claims British Intelligence Offered to Help Him Escape after 9/11

2002-2004: 7/7 London Bombers Attend Sermons Given by Extremist Imam Abu Hamza Who Has Deal with MI5

Summer-Early November 2002: Second Informant Helps British Intelligence Communicate with Informer Abu Qatada

November 8, 2002-December 7, 2002: British Residents Interrogated in Gambia by CIA because of Deliberately False Tip from British Intelligence

March 2003 and After: Alleged Leader of Al-Qaeda Bomb Plot Is Monitored in Britain but Mysteriously Never Arrested or Even Questioned

Shortly Before July 2003: Head 7/7 London Bomber Monitored Talking to Key Alleged Al-Qaeda Operative in Britain

February 2004: Possible 7/7 London Bombings Mastermind Monitored Meeting with Leaders of Fertilizer Bomb Plot

March 29, 2004 and After: British Intelligence Fails to Monitor 7/7 London Bomber after Recording Him Discussing Plans to Build Bomb and Attend Al-Qaeda Training Camp

April 26, 2004: British Government Alleges London Imam Abu Hamza Linked to Five Terrorist Groups, but Does Not Yet Charge Him with Any Crime

May 2-August 2004: British Intelligence Monitors Copycat London Bombers Attending Training Camps in Britain, but Takes No Action

Before May 27, 2004: US Official Speculates Abu Hamza ‘Untouchable’ Because British Informer

Before May 27, 2004: MI5 Has Information Showing Abu Hamza’s Radical Militant Connections, but Does Not Show It to Home Secretary

July 29, 2005: Counterterrorism Expert Claims Possible 7/7 Bombings Mastermind Was Working for British Intelligence

Late July 2005 and After: British Authorities Mysteriously Uninterested in Possible 7/7 Bombings Mastermind

April 20, 2006: British Government Demands Al-Rawi Be Released from Guantanamo after It Is Revealed He Was British Informant

May 13-14, 2006: Key Evidence about Lead 7/7 Bomber Kept from Committee Investigating 7/7 Bombings

June 26, 2006: Counterterrorism Expert Suggests Head 7/7 London Bomber Could Have Been British Intelligence Informant

 

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